Sixty years ago, during the Tay Son Tinh Campaign, our forces smashed the enemy’s “Operations Double Hawk” by employing a flexible, dangerous, and sharp offensive posture. The victory of the campaign marked a significant development in Vietnamese military art in the early stage of American Local War Strategy, most notably the art of “shaping the battlefield and creating opportunities.”  

After suffering heavy defeats in 1965, entering 1966, the U.S. and its puppet forces concentrated all their power to launch the first dry-season strategic counteroffensive, aiming to “search and destroy” and “break the backbone of the Viet Cong” throughout South Vietnam. In the Military Region 5, they launched three large-scale operations into Northern Binh Dinh (the main direction), Southern Quang Ngai, and Northern Phu Yen. Upon detecting the presence of Division 2, the main force of the Liberation Army, in the Tay Son Tinh area, the enemy immediately mobilised a large number of troops and means to conduct attacks by both ground maneuver and airborne landings, attempting to “wipe out” our Division 2.

As far as our forces were concerned, thoroughly grasping the guiding principles of the Party Central Committee and directives of the Regional Command noting that “Units and localities must resolutely maintain the initiative, not allow the enemy to concentrate forces to strike in one direction, and compel them to disperse their forces to cope…,” and based on accurate analysis and assessment of the situation, the Military Region 5 Party Committee and Command decided to launch the Tay Son Tinh Campaign. The campaign aimed to wear down and annihilate part of the U.S. forces, destroy a large portion of the puppet’s main forces, compel them to overstretch and disperse their forces, and support other battlefields in defeating the enemy’s “search and destroy” operations. The campaign was conducted in four phases across the districts of Son Tinh, Binh Son, Nghia Hanh, Tu Nghia, and Mo Duc, in which Tay Son Tinh designated as the main operational area.

Given the courageous, resilient, resourceful, and creative fighting spirit combined with distinctive military art, our military and people dealt the enemy a “deserved blow,” thereby firmly affirming the capability of the Regional main force to annihilate individual American elite battalions, creating a foundation for defeating the enemy’s first dry-season strategic counteroffensive. The victory of the campaign left many valuable lessons in campaign-level operational art, especially the art of shaping the battlefield and creating opportunities to counter U.S. forces.

Enemy forces conducting airborne transport tactic (A file photo)

First, accurately selecting the timing to launch the campaign and the main operational area was the decisive factor in seizing and maintaining the initiative, ensuring that the enemy was fought according to our predetermined plan. When it became apparent that the enemy had committed most of its forces and means - five Marine battalions - to the “Operations Double Hawk” in Southern Quang Ngai, thereby exposing vulnerabilities in Northern Quang Ngai, and that the remaining U.S. forces at Chu Lai base were only about three to four battalions, the Military Region Command immediately seized the opportunity and resolved to launch the Tay Son Tinh Campaign. This was a correct decision, reflecting the sharp and sensitive assessment of the situation by the Military Region Command and its staff. The campaign was launched while the enemy was conducting three large-scale operations in the region, creating strategic surprise. As a result, when our forces attacked, the enemy became passive and confused and was forced to overstretch and disperse its forces to cope, thereby creating favourable opportunities to strike the enemy at its vulnerable points. At the same time, this reduced pressure on our combat operations in Northern Binh Dinh and Southern Quang Ngai.

In addition, the Campaign Command identified Tay Son Tinh as the main operational area. This area held great tactical value with the National Highway 1, a vital artery, running through. It was also near to Quang Ngai town and Chu Lai base, 10 kilometres and 20 kilometres respectively. Once this area was attacked, the risk of being cut off was very high, compelling the enemy to conduct relief operations. Moreover, the sudden appearance of a unit of the Liberation Army’s main force threatening the highway struck directly at the enemy’s ongoing “search and destroy” plan, prompting the enemy to view this as a prime opportunity to annihilate our main force. Moreover, most of the campaign area was liberated territory, providing favourable conditions for battlefield preparation and force deployment, particularly with support from local armed forces in stretching and dispersing the enemy, enabling our main force to concentrate combat power in the main direction. As anticipated, after our forces cut and threatened the National Highway 1 and destroyed part of the puppet troops, the enemy immediately deployed forces to occupy Huong Mountain, established artillery positions at Soi Slope, and mobilised four Marine battalions from Chu Lai base, seven puppet battalions from Quang Ngai town, and numerous tanks and armoured vehicles to conduct relief operations. These enemy actions created favourable conditions for the campaign to strike the enemy according to the predetermined plan.

Second, it is necessary to organise and employ forces rationally to create superior combat power and ensure firm victory. The primary target of the campaign was U.S. forces, which enjoyed advantages in equipment, mobility, and fire support. Therefore, rational force employment and disposition to effectively apply the art of “using the few to defeat the many, using the weak to defeat the strong” was a key factor in achieving victory. Adhering closely to the principle of “strike key points, annihilate small to medium relief forces, and lure in large relief forces,” the Campaign Command employed engineering units in coordination with guerrilla forces to cut National Highway 1. At the same time, the Regiment 21 and Regiment 1 were concentrated to repel multiple relief operations by puppet troops, threatening the highway for many consecutive days and forcing U.S. forces at Chu Lai base to enter the battle, thereby falling into the battlefield posture prepared in advance by our forces.

Entering Phase Two of the campaign, although the enemy had “fallen into the trap,” the mobile relief force was larger than anticipated. On recognising that it was impossible to strike both targets simultaneously, the Campaign Command and staff promptly adjusted the operational plan, organised forces with clear focus and priority, and struck the main target first. Accordingly, Battalion 48 and Battalion 83 of Quang Ngai Province and local armed forces conducted small-scale engagements to block puppet troops in the Dai Loc and An Diem directions, creating conditions for Division 2 to attack and annihilate U.S. airborne troops landing at the 62 Heights and Go Cat. This was an appropriate decision based on accurate assessment of “knowing the enemy and knowing ourselves” because, given our available forces, the dispersion of the main force to engage both ground relief and airborne forces would have led to overextension, command difficulties, and insufficient concentration of combat power. Conversely, in key decisive battles, the campaign was able to concentrate forces, deploy formations to encircle, divide, and isolate the enemy in specific areas, maintain strong reserve forces, and be ready to effectively handle combat situations through multiple operational options.

In practice, at the battle of 62 Heights, the enemy had one battalion, while our forces employed the entire Regiment 21 together with divisional firepower to create overwhelming superiority. In addition, Battalion 22 was positioned north of 62 Heights, Battalion 33 was deployed in the southeast of 62 Heights, Battalion 11 was reserve while mortar and 12.7 mm units were deployed on the flank and rear of Battalion 22, forming an encirclement and isolation posture that prevented the enemy from linking up with forces at Go Cat. Thanks to rational force employment and disposition to create overwhelming superiority, within just two days our forces annihilated nearly two Marine battalions, the most elite and lethal units of the U.S. military, and inflicted heavy losses on another battalion, contributing decisively to the complete victory of the campaign.

Third, resolute and flexible command and timely transformation of the battlefield posture. To counter the enemy’s cunning intentions and tactics, the Campaign Command and staff closely monitored developments in each engagement, accurately anticipated enemy actions, and used this as a basis for flexible and timely command and control, creating favourable battlefield conditions and seizing and maintaining the initiative from the outset. In fact, upon detecting signs of enemy force concentration and preparation of offensive staging areas at Huong Mountain and Soi Slope, the Campaign Command ordered Regiment 21 to maneuver to Nam Binh - Hoa Vinh and Regiment 1 to Vinh Khanh - Phuoc Loc to prepare for countering airborne landings. This enabled units to develop plans early, establish solid defensive postures, and proactively engage the enemy as soon as it landed. When the enemy seized the 62 Heights, a tactically valuable height linking 97 Heights, Chua Hill, and the Ca Ty Mountains, the Campaign Command resolutely ordered Regiment 21 to conduct an attack to annihilate the enemy on the same day, decisively recapturing the position and denying the enemy advantageous terrain, thereby forcing it to deploy in an unfavourable posture and preventing it from exploiting its firepower and planned converging attacks.

During Phase Two of the campaign, after deeply grasping the enemy’s tactic of landing on the flanks and at the rear of our formations, the Campaign Command skillfully employed the principle of “using the enemy’s trick against itself” by maneuvering the remaining elements of Regiment 1 to the Vinh Loc - Phuoc Loc area to “set the trap,” thereby annihilating most of the Marine battalion as it landed at Non Mountain. Notably, after each engagement, units rapidly maneuvered to new areas to avoid enemy fire and establish new battlefield posture. Thanks to resolute and flexible command and control, our forces continuously transformed the battlefield posture, reversed situations, maintained the initiative, “neutralised the enemy’s strengths and exploited its weaknesses,” forced the enemy into a passive defensive stance, and ultimately destroyed it.   

The victory of the Tay Son Tinh Campaign smashed one of the three “search and destroy” operations conducted by the enemy in Military Region 5, creating a foundation for defeating the American Local War Strategy. The valuable lessons on the art of “shaping the battlefield and creating opportunities” drawn from this campaign should be further studied, developed, and creatively applied under new conditions of people’s war in defence of the Fatherland.

Doctor TRAN LENH AN, Army Officer College No. 2