In the North Binh Dinh counter-offensive Campaign, despite facing elite US forces, through the excellent execution of the opening engagement, we successfully created a major breakthrough and drove the Campaign to complete victory. This contributed to the defeat of the enemy’s First Dry-Season Strategic Counter-Offensive Plan on the Southern battlefield.

In early 1966, having conducted a massive deployment of over 200,000 troops along with a vast quantity of modern weapons, equipment, and war materiel to South Vietnam, the US and Saigon puppet regime forces launched the First Dry-Season Strategic Counter-Offensive. Their aim was to eliminate our revolutionary bases and “search and destroy” our main forces in Eastern South Vietnam and Military Region 5.

In Military Region 5’s area of operation, the enemy identified the area of North Binh Dinh as a key focus due to the presence of our Division 3 - a regular division of the Liberation Army which had inflicted major defeats upon them at Thuan Ninh and Hoi Son. To realise this plan, the enemy mobilised a large force to launch three operations, namely “Masher”, “White Wing I”, and “White Wing II” into the districts of Hoai Nhon, An Lao, Hoai An, and Phu My. They aimed to “wipe out” our Division 3, whilst simultaneously supporting the “pacification” efforts of Saigon puppet troops in Military Region 5’s lowlands, attempting to gradually regain the initiative on the battlefield.

US forces deployed to South Vietnam in 1965 (file photo)

To deal with the enemy’s new strategic plans and combat tactics, the Party Central Committee decided to evoke the determination to fight the US among our troops and people, adhering to the principle of “active offensive combined with resolute counter-offensive”, to maintain and intensify the offensive momentum of the revolution in the South. In strict implementation of this directive, the Party Committee and Command of Military Region 5 decided to launch North Binh Dinh Counter-Offensive Campaign. The aim was to wear down and annihilate a significant portion of the US force and its allies, inflict heavy losses on Saigon puppet troops, and contribute to the overall effort to defeat their First Dry-Season Counter-Offensive Plan. The forces participating in the Campaign included Division 3 and local armed forces of Hoai Nhon, An Lao, Hoai An, and Phu My districts.

With courage, resilience, and creative combat tactics, troops and people of Military Region 5 achieved a resounding victory. In particular, we successfully “baited” and “lured” the enemy into a pre-arranged combat posture to execute the Campaign’s decisive engagement in Kim Son Valley. This became an outstanding example of the art of counter-offensive during the initial stages of direct combat against elite US forces on the Southern theatre.

First, accurately assessing the enemy’s capability and correctly identifying the main operational area. This was a particularly important requirement in a counter-offensive campaign, enabling us to formulate accurate operational plans, seize the initiative, and ensure success in the opening engagement. Accordingly, the Campaign Command and Staff carefully studied and assessed the enemy’s intent and methods in their “search and destroy” operations against our Division 3. They gained a firm grasp of the enemy’s strength, firepower, and helicopter support capabilities as well as the enemy’s plan to combine ground attacks with airborne landings to seize areas, such as Cho Cat, Cu Tai, Hoi Phu, Gia Huu, Hill 10 and the western slopes of Tam Quan to envelop, encircle, and annihilate our main forces, secure victory, and withdraw US troops from the battlefield as soon as possible.

On the basis of that accurate assessment, the Campaign Command identified Tam Quan - northern Bong Son as the main operational area for the opening engagement. This was an entirely correct decision, reflecting the Campaign Command’s sharp and logical thinking, as the area had significant tactical value, controlling key communication routes from National Highway 1 to An Lao, Hoai An, and Phu My. In particular, National Highway 1 was a vital artery as it allowed various battlefields to be linked together and US units in the Central Highlands were supplied via this route. If we held the section running through Tam Quan - northern Bong Son, the enemy would be forced to deploy troops to secure it, thereby creating conditions for us to destroy them according to our predetermined intention and plan. Moreover, the area was largely mountainous, fragmented by many rivers and streams, with a narrow frontage, providing ideal conditions for us to conceal our troops and prepare the battlefield. In combat, this would limit the destructive power of enemy air and artillery fire and restrict their mechanised mobility. Within that area, the mass resistance movement among local population was strong, our defensive position system was robust, and supply sources were abundant, making it well suited to a prolonged campaign.

In reality, the Campaign unfolded exactly as anticipated. The enemy deployed large formations, including three US battalions, into Hoai Huong, Hoai Chau and Hoai Hao, with the intention of encircling and envelop our force in Tam Quan - northern Bong Son area. Thanks to the correct assessment of the enemy and the accurate identification of the main operational zone, the Campaign Command was able to make proactive preparations, anticipate various contingencies, and secure victory in the opening engagement.

Second, establishing an inter-connected, lethal defensive - counteroffensive posture, with flexible transformation. In the opening phase of a counter-offensive campaign, the enemy often enjoys the early initiative and strong initial momentum, and has yet to reveal weaknesses; the initial balance of forces therefore favours the enemy. To ensure victory in the opening engagement, it is essential to create a combat posture favourable to us and unfavourable to the enemy, maximise the combat power of our forces, and minimise the enemy’s capabilities. Based on our combat capabilities and the terrain in the main operational area, the Campaign Command deployed Regiment 22 together with local armed forces to launch a counter-attack against the enemy in Tam Quan - northern Bong Son; Regiment 12 to engage the enemy from southern Bong Son to Phu Huu; and Regiment 2 to attack the enemy from Cat Son to My Chanh and from Thuan Ninh to Cho Ganh. This created a widespread yet focused campaign posture, aiming to support the opening battle. Within Tam Quan, Battalion 7 was deployed at Hoai Chau, Battalion 8 at southern Tam Quan, and Battalion 9 in Cho Cat - Hoai Hao area, responsible for the main defensive direction. Fire support units were interspersed, with priority given to Battalion 9, forming a solid “tripod” capable of mutual support and effective defence against enemy attacks from multiple directions. At the same time, local forces and guerrillas were tasked with intercepting and harassing the enemy from afar, holding ground, and conducting attritional actions on the enemy’s flanks and rear, forcing the enemy to disperse their efforts, creating opportunities for concentrated, decisive blows by our main-force units. Through this deployment, we created a complex, inter-connected defensive posture combined with a broad, interwoven offensive stance. On the first day of the Campaign alone, Regiment 22, in coordination with local armed forces, repelled multiple enemy attacks and firmly held their positions. Notably, Battalion 9, together with local forces, relied on a multi-layered defensive system to form an interlinked posture in Cho Cat, inflicting heavy losses on nearly a full air cavalry battalion - the most elite US force - and downed ten helicopters.

Throughout the fighting, the Campaign Command closely monitored combat developments, promptly manoeuvring main-force units to prevent them from being fixed in one place, thus directly countering the enemy’s “search and destroy” tactics. After inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, most of Regiment 22 was secretly withdrawn to the rear; only Battalion 8 operated in a dispersed manner in support of local forces. As a result, although US forces suffered heavy losses, they were still unable to determine the whereabouts of our main forces. In desperation, the enemy launched “White Wing I” and “White Wing II” operations, determined to locate our main force. Step by step, however, they walked into the decisive combat area we had already set up in Kim Son valley, where we fought the key engagement, destroying large numbers of US troops and forcing them to withdraw earlier than planned.

Third, flexibly, creatively applying combat methods, tactical forms, and fighting techniques. In Northern Binh Dinh Campaign, the enemy enjoyed superiority in manpower, firepower, and rapid mobility, and held temporal and spatial initiative. Their already strong initial combat power was thus further reinforced. However, they also had a “fatal” weakness: a fear of close quarter combat, intermingled fighting, and prolonged engagements. Recognising this, the Campaign Command initiated small-scale engagements, primarily through concentrated company-level skirmishes, while closely coordinating operations between main forces, local forces, and guerrillas. This forced the enemy to reveal their number, equipment, and tactics early, preventing them from implementing plans for concentrated, segmented attacks. Step by step, our forces resolved difficulties, overcame contradictions, and found effective ways to defeat elite US units.

In reality, the Campaign Command creatively and flexibly applied various tactical forms and fighting techniques. When the enemy attacked our positions, Battalion 9 conducted defence - counteroffensive actions in Cho Cat; Battalion 7 organised multiple blocking and manoeuvre attacks, including engagements at Chuong Hoa and Lieu An, which eliminated hundreds of enemy troops. On the southern Bong Son axis, Regiment 12 launched raids on Hoa Hoi airfield and artillery positions at Phu Ly, destroying 60 aircraft and several military vehicles. This created a widespread operational posture, attacking the enemy from the front, flanks, and rear, forcing them to overstretch and defend on multiple fronts, leading to a collapse in morale and eventual destruction.

Victory in the opening engagement created a crucial turning point, driving Northern Binh Dinh Counter-offensive Campaign to a complete success and reinforcing the resolve of our Military and people nationwide to “dare to fight, be determined to fight, and be determined to win” against American aggressors. This victory provided many valuable lessons in military art that should continue to be studied and developed in line with the new conditions of a (potential) people’s war to defend the Fatherland in the future.

Sr. Col. DANG DUC GIANG, PhD

Infantry Officer College No.1