Fifty years ago, the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising, culminating in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, achieved complete victory. This monumental triumph was the result of a multitude of factors, with the Party’s masterful strategic leadership standing out as the most fundamental, decisive element - one that retains its profound significance in the contemporary era.
The 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising began with the Central Highlands Campaign and concluded with the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign. In this decisive strategic battle, we shattered over one million enemy troops, completely dismantled the neo-colonial regime, liberated the South, and unified the country. This marked the beginning of a new era of independence and national unity, with the entire nation advancing towards socialism. The 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising had immense military, political, economic, and diplomatic significance, affirming the Party’s art of leadership and its skilful strategic direction.
1. Accurate assessment of the situation, seizing the opportunity, and timely, precise strategic decision-making
Under the 1973 Paris Agreement, the US imperialist was forced to withdraw its troops and cease all military intervention in South Vietnam. However, driven by its aggressive, imperialistic nature, the United States continued to reinforce its support for the puppet regime and military, with the intention of “Vietnamising the war.” Understanding the enemy’s schemes and tactics and driven by a strong desire for national independence and reunification, in October 1973, the 21st Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee (3rd Tenure) issued a resolution on “The Great Victory of the Resistance War Against America and the Tasks of the Revolution in South Vietnam in the New Phase.” This resolution affirmed that the path of the South Vietnamese revolution was a revolutionary path of violence. In any situation, we had to seize the opportunity, stay committed to the strategy of offensive, and flexibly direct the revolution to progress. Guided by Resolution 21, the wise and timely leadership of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, as well as the military and people of the South, engaged in numerous military and political actions to prevent the enemy from sabotaging the Paris Agreement and achieved significant victories.
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| In a rubber forest in Dong Nai, Company 2, Batallion 9, Regiment 3 of Division 304 was handled over the victorious flag before they came to liberate Saigon (A file photo) |
To realise the goal of liberating the South as soon as possible, in 1974, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission directed multiple campaigns in strategic areas, such as Nong Son - Thuong Duc, La Son - Mo Tau, and Road 14 - Phuoc Long. These were designed to probe and evaluate the strength of the Saigon puppet forces and the likelihood of American military intervention. Through these campaigns, the Politburo drew crucial conclusions about the balance of forces on the battlefield: We were in a dominant, upward position; the enemy was in a losing, downward trajectory. The US had withdrawn and was facing numerous difficulties, rendering it incapable of returning (via direct military intervention). Consequently, from 18 December 1974 to 8 January 1975, the Politburo held its second meeting, affirming that this was the most favourable time for the people to completely liberate the South and secure a full victory. They also approved the Strategic Plan to Liberate the South within 1975-1976, which included the possibility of liberating the South within 1975 if the opportunity arose. In line with the Politburo’s strategic resolve, the General Staff played a key role in advising the Politburo and the Central Military Commission, leading and directing the General Offensive, particularly in monitoring the situation, developing plans, committing strategic decisions, and organising forces on the battlefield.
In light of the rapid developments of the Central Highlands Campaign, especially after the victory at Buon Ma Thuot, on 18 March 1975, the Politburo and the Central Military Party Commission made the decision to liberate the South within 1975. They also directed the urgent mobilisation of forces to liberate Tri Thien, Hue, Da Nang, and central provinces, creating a strategic and tactical advantage for the liberation of Saigon. Through these strategic victories across various battlefronts, the Politburo recognised: in terms of strategy, military and political forces, we had overwhelming strength, and the enemy stood on the brink of collapse. The US was entirely powerless; even if they sent reinforcements, they could not save the puppet regime. Accordingly, on 1 April 1975, the Politburo convened and decided: “We must seize the strategic opportunity, commit to a general offensive and uprising, and bring the liberation war to a successful conclusion in the shortest time possible. It is preferable to start and finish within April this year, without delay.” On 4 April 1975, following the Politburo’s instructions, the Central Military Commission, and the General Staff, directed the Navy to coordinate with Military Region 5 to liberate the islands in the Spratly Archipelago. On 14 April 1975, the Politburo approved the campaign to liberate Saigon - Gia Định, named the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.
After 55 days and nights of fierce combat, with the slogan: “Fast, bold, surprise, sure victory,” and “One day equals twenty years,” our military and people achieved a complete victory in the historic Ho Chi Minh Campaign, bringing the Resistance War Against America to a glorious end. This victory demonstrates the Party’s sharp strategic vision and masterful leadership in assessing the situation, understanding the laws of revolutionary warfare, quickly identifying new factors, and, most importantly, being astute in responding to the enemy’s movements. The Party continuously adjusted its strategic resolve, exploited, and created opportunities, making decisive moves to seize the right moment for victory.
2. Directing the preparation of strong forces, deploying a strategic trap, and ensuring certain victory
The 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising achieved total victory in nearly two months. This remarkable success was largely due to the Party’s effective planning, which involved large-scale preparation of both human resources and infrastructure, especially the cadre team and weaponry. This preparation ensured the execution of the strategic resolve to secure total victory in the shortest possible time, with minimal casualties. In practice, to implement the strategic resolve, alongside directing various fronts to develop local forces at the provincial and district levels, as well as militia and self-defence units working in coordination with main force units to attack and destroy the enemy, and supporting the people’s uprising while securing localities, from October 1973 to early 1975, we organised the establishment of four strategically mobile main force corps with combined arms units, creating powerful “iron fists” in key strategic areas. Simultaneously, we reinforced weaponry, equipment, and supplies to support the Southern battlefield.
Along with preparing strong forces, the Politburo instructed the Central Military Commission and the General Staff to proactively prepare the battlefield and create a strategic setup aimed at creating a secret, surprise, and assured victory. In line with the strategic resolve to liberate the South, to facilitate and ensure the success of the Central Highlands Campaign - the opening strategic offensive - the Politburo directed an intensification of military activities in Tri Thien, Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, etc., in order to coordinate operations, stretch enemy forces, and prevent them from reinforcing their troops in the Central Highlands. After liberating the Central Highlands, the Politburo ordered the entire army to seize the opportunity to increase the pace of the offensive. As a result, the units rapidly advanced southward to the coastal regions of Central Vietnam, progressively liberating Binh Khe, Phu Yen, Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, etc., shattering the enemy’s strategic defensive system and creating new strategic opportunities. Next, we launched a strategic offensive on Hue and Da Nang, completely changing the dynamics of the battlefield in terms of both forces and positioning. Seizing the opportunity, our main force units quickly manoeuvred towards the liberation of Saigon. Thus, from a strategic perspective, the Party successfully capitalised on the opportunity, managing to prepare strong forces and deploy a tactical setup that was both intricate and secretive, attacking the enemy across vast areas while concentrating our powerful forces at key directions, urban centres, enemy strongholds, and large military concentrations, ensuring total victory.
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| General Cuong checks training work of Regiment 66, Division 10, Army Corps 34 (Photo: qdnd.vn) |
3. Maximising the comprehensive power of people’s war, combining offensives and uprisings, and securing total victory
A distinctive feature of the military strategy, and one of the Party’s most remarkable successes in leading and developing the people’s war during the resistance against American imperialism in general, and the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising in particular, was the close combination of military offensives and popular uprisings. This involved a blend of large-scale military assaults by main force units directly targeting cities, key administrative centres, and major enemy military bases, alongside the strong popular uprising by the revolutionary masses, which shattered the puppet regime’s control in localities, liberated strategic areas, and paved the way for the complete liberation of the South.
With the goal of liberating the South before the rainy season of 1975, on 27 March 1975, the Politburo issued instructions: “We must quickly mobilise the armed masses for an uprising, dismantling the enemy’s forces at the grassroots level, seizing government offices, warehouses, and factories, establishing revolutionary governments, and mobilising enemy soldiers to surrender their weapons, leading to the disintegration of the enemy’s military units”. To create a strategic setup and open the gateways for our main forces to advance into Saigon, on 9 April 1975, the General Staff directed the main force units in the South to launch major offensives in combination with uprisings, conducting encirclements and cutting off Saigon-Gia Định along two axes: Xuan Loc in the northeast and Thu Thua, Ben Luc in the southwest, blocking Road 4 and opening corridors to the southwestern provinces. At 17:00 on 26 April 1975, five columns, comprising four main force corps and Division 232, simultaneously entered Saigon. Meanwhile, the Saigon-Gia Dinh City Party Committee mobilised over 1,700 cadres into the city’s districts and surrounding areas, working with local authorities to incite the masses to rise up, in coordination with the main force’s offensive. The city’s armed forces, including local troops, militia, guerrillas, and special forces, actively cooperated in fighting and guiding the main force units to capture key targets within the city.
With strict, scientific organisation, flexible and creative tactics, and overwhelming strength, from the early days of the campaign, our forces destroyed the enemy’s outer defensive divisions, preventing them from retreating to the outskirts of the city. Simultaneously, we organised strong raiding forces that penetrated deep into Saigon’s inner city. By 11:30 on 30 April 1975, the Liberation Army entered the Independence Palace, capturing the entire cabinet of the Saigon puppet regime and forcing President Duong Van Minh to declare unconditional surrender. Seizing the opportunity of the enemy’s surrender, the Politburo and the Central Military Party Commission instructed the Southern armed forces to rapidly join with the people of the Mekong Delta in combining offensives and uprisings, killing a portion of the enemy, capturing, and disintegrating the entire enemy’s 4th Corps, liberating the Mekong Delta in just two days (30 April and 1 May 1975).
4. Combining the strength of the nation with the strength of the era, creating comprehensive power to defeat the enemy
It can be affirmed that throughout the 30 years of revolutionary warfare, alongside maximising the power of the nation through military, political, and other activities, our Party has always placed great emphasis on strengthening international solidarity and harnessing the greatest power of the era, contributing to creating a significant advantage in defeating the enemy. In the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising, with the policy of pushing back the possibility of a US military intervention, through flexible and astute diplomatic measures, our Party aligned the national resistance against US imperialism with the global wave of revolutionary trends. We expanded foreign relations, sought international support, and received assistance for the task of building socialism in the North and the struggle for national liberation in the South. This involved enhancing comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union, China, and socialist countries; strengthening combat solidarity with Laos, Cambodia, and liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; maximising the support of progressive people worldwide, coordinating effectively with the global struggle at the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and regional organisations. This affirmed that our Party had excellently implemented its political, military, and diplomatic policies; maximised the power of the nation alongside the power of the era, creating a combined force to defeat the US imperialist invaders and their puppet allies. The great victory of Spring 1975 marked a “golden milestone” in the history of Vietnam in its “historic confrontation” against US imperialist aggression. Looking back on the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising, we gain a deeper understanding of the Party’s masterful war leadership, which left invaluable lessons for the task of building and defending our country today. These lessons include the need to remain steadfast in the goal of national independence linked to socialism; to maintain and strengthen the absolute and direct leadership of the Party over all aspects of the defense and protection of the Fatherland; to closely follow reality, correctly identify opportunities, and intensify international cooperation to leverage resources, especially from major powers, neighbouring countries, strategic partners, and regional nations, in order to continuously enhance our country’s position and prestige on the international stage, effectively serving the cause of building and defending the Fatherland. Additionally, we must harness the power of the great national unity, build a national defense system, establish a national defence posture linked with the security of the people, and strengthen the people’s security system. The core of this effort should be to build a “revolutionary, regular, elite, modern” people’s armed forces to protect the Fatherland early and from afar.
General NGUYEN TAN CUONG, Member of the Central Party Committee, Member of the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission, Chief of Staff of the Vietnam People’s Army, Deputy Minister of National Defence