Force organisation and utilisation are crucial elements in generating combat power and achieving victory in each engagement and operation, and the entire conflict. In terms of the 1972 Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang Defensive Operation, force organisation and utilisation became a form of distinctive art, contributing to the complete defeat of the enemy’s large-scale strategic offensive and creating a new scenario in our resistance war against US imperialists for national salvation.

After being driven out of the Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang, since mid-April 1972, the enemy had hastily reinforced their troops¹ and rotated Vang Pao’s heavily damaged units in an attempt to reclaim this strategically important region during the rainy season. To this end, the enemy formed four command zones around the Plain of Jars, namely Sam Thong - Long Tieng, Ban Longe, Tom Thiang - Pha Dong, and Sala Phu Khun.

An 82mm mortar battery during the Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang Defensive Operation in 1972 (file photo)

On our side, upon completing the offensive to liberate the Plain of Jars and penetrating deep into the Sam Thong - Long Tieng area, under the Central Military Commission’s directive, our units proactively coordinated closely with Pathet Lao forces to promptly switch to defensive posture and carry out the 1972 Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang Defensive Operation, ready to defeat the enemy’s offensives during the rainy season, maintain the strategic posture in Northern Laos, and firmly protect the right flank of our strategic offensive in the Central Highlands and Tri - Thien region. With their positive, proactive, resilient, and steadfast spirit, our regular units and Lao forces conducted hundreds of engagements of various scales with a wide range of tactics to defeat the enemy’s large-scale offensives and cause significant damage to the critical part of the enemy’s strength², maintain control over the strategic Plain of Jars, and create a continuous robust link between the key liberated areas of our side and Lao side. This critical victory further accelerated the failure of Nixon’s doctrine in Laos, leading to the collapse of the formula of “Lao puppet troops + Thai mercenaries + maximum support from American airpower and logistics”. It marked a breakthrough development in the art of defensive operation, with distinctive features in the organisation and utilisation of forces.

First, concentrating forces on the main defensive directions and areas. After receiving the order to bring our forces into defensive posture, the Operation Command studied and assessed the overall situation, especially in the quadrilateral area of Muong Soui - Nong Pet - Xiangkhouang Town - Tham Luong, with the Plain of Jars at its centre and decided to organise our forces in different defensive areas. Accordingly, two infantry regiments (Regiments 164 and 866), one-third of the armoured and tank force, and one-quarter of the artillery force under the Operation Command were concentrated in the main defensive area to establish solid and inter-connected defensive network in the centre of the Plain of Jars. At the same time, Regiment 174 (replacing Regiment 335), along with one company of towed artillery and one understrength battalion of 12.7mm anti-aircraft gun was deployed to block the enemy at Hin Tang, creating a “hard shell” to proactively engage the enemy early and from afar in the outer operational area along the main defensive axis (this deployment was unprecedented in any previous battlefield-type defence).

This was proven to be an absolutely correct decision and a key distinction in how the Operation Command utilised its forces. If our units had been spread evenly, as in earlier tactical-level battlefield-type defensive engagements, it would have been difficult to show the superiority of combat power in each direction and key area or at critical moments amidst the wide area of defence with sparse population and limited strength of our forces, and given the fact that our units had just switched to defensive posture while the enemy was advancing from multiple directions with large numbers of troops supported by strong artillery and air firepower.

Therefore, despite the fact that at some points of the Operation, the enemy concentrated up to 40 battalions, launching relentless attacks from multiple directions and even continuously shifting their main axis of attack from the northwest (Phase 2) to the west (Phase 3) and then to the south (Phase 4) against our main defensive area through the art of using force concentration and the strength of interoperability, we were able to quickly defeat their major offensives, inflict devastating losses upon the enemy, firmly maintain control over the central area of the Plain of Jars for an extended period, thereby creating favourable conditions and opportunities for our mobile defensive forces to deliver decisive blows, ultimately bringing an end to the Operation.

Second, organising strong and flexible mobile forces to conduct highly effective counterattacks and counter-assaults. Faced with the enemy’s superiority of strength, firepower, and combat vehicles, for the first time ever in the Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang Defensive Operation we organised our forces into two core components, namely on-site defence forces and mobile forces against the enemy in various directions. The latter were organised to be strong and flexible and creative right from the start, highlighting the philosophy of “proactive offensive in defence”. This was a distinctive feature of the art of force utilisation. Traditionally, in previous battlefield-type defence operations, we used three-quarters of the forces for defence and one-quarter of the forces for reserves. However, in this Operation, our command boldly allocated half of the infantry force (two regiments), two-thirds of the tanks, and three-quarters of the artillery for mobile tasks. These formed powerful “striking hands”, allowing us to shift the posture of the operation flexibly and opportunely launch counter-attacks and counter-assaults against the advancing enemy, crushing their main forces. Thanks to this flexible approach, throughout the Operation, 8 out of our 14 battalions (57%) were assigned to undertake mobile tasks, and these units were utilised in both operational and tactical levels. As a result, whenever the enemy launched massive assaults on the centre of the Plain of Jars from multiple directions, we always had sufficient mobile forces to conduct key counterattacks and counter-assaults, gaining the victory with a high level of combat performance.

In practice, during Phase 2 of the Operation, Regiment 335 coordinated closely with two Lao battalions, Regiment 866’s on-site defence force, along with tank and artillery units under the Operation Command, conducted interoperability counter-assault (the Operation’s key engagement) against the enemy at Phou Keng. Notably, when receiving Regiment 88 as additional reinforcements from the Ministry of National Defence in October 1972, the Operation Command decided to expand the mobile force to nearly 65% of its strength (accounting for nearly two-thirds of the forces of the Operation). As a result, when the enemy mobilised a massive force to shift their main axis of attack to the southern Plain of Jars, we were able to fully address previous limitations and inefficiencies in force utilisation and quickly concentrate a strong division-level mobile force unit to carry out the largest counter-assault - the decisive engagement of the Operation, completely crushing the enemy’s major offensive and gaining the victory of the Operation.

Third, closely coordinating with Lao Pathet units to create combined strength to defeat the enemy’s offensives. Recognising the strategic significance of the Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang in executing their combat intentions across the Indochina battlefield, the enemy mobilised massive forces and a large number of equipment and overwhelming firepower in a bid to drive us out of the defensive area at all costs. In response to the enemy’s prowess, the Central Military Commission proactively cooperated with the Lao side in mobilising a sizable force³ of highly capable units with extensive combat experience and deep knowledge of the terrain into the Operation. To bring into full play the abilities, experiences, and strengths of these units for the sake of creating combined strength to defeat the enemy’s large-scale offensives, coordination between our forces and Lao ones was prioritised for the Operation Command from the outset. According to the combat resolution of the Operation’s commandant, our side and Lao one had agreed to use the latter’s on-site force to infiltrate deep into enemy area to gather comprehensive situational developments since the enemy was poised to attack. Those findings would serve as the basis for our forces to make necessary preparations in all directions. Specifically, our forces were mainly responsible for the task of defending the central Plain of Jars, the intermediary area, and Nong Pet while the Lao side was responsible for combat coordination in Xiangkhouang and Muong Soui. During the course of the Operation, when the enemy advanced on land or conducted airborne assaults on the joint operational zones, on the basis of joint agreements, the two sides would work together to fight against the enemy. In case the Lao side was threatened, we would be ready to deploy mobile forces or reinforce the Lao side’s defensive positions according to the Command’s strategy. This high level of coordination was a highlight of the art of force utilisation in this Operation, showcasing the unity, solidarity, friendship, and special combat alliance between the armed forces of the two nations. Through clear, organised task allocation, our forces and Lao ones created an interconnected and solid defensive network with a clear focus on key areas. We maintained an active stance in striking the enemy from various directions, while also ensuring mutual support, reinforcement, and flexibility in command and coordination. This allowed each force to fully utilise its strengths throughout the Operation, creating combined power that defeated the enemy’s assaults and enabled us to firmly defend our battlefield.

The realities showed that during the course of the Operation, thanks to close coordination with Lao units, our Command was able to effectively fend off the enemy’s advances in all directions while mustering sufficient forces to successfully fight three key engagements and firmly protect the assigned defensive areas. For instance, during Phase 4 of the Operation, when the enemy deployed four additional mobile groups (21^st, 26^th, 30^th, and 32^nd GMs), two Thai battalions, and two artillery companies, etc. with on-site units (two GMs) and shifted their main offensive direction towards the southern Plain of Jars, the Operation Command quickly adjusted its strategy. In close and seamless cooperation with Lao forces, our forces implemented the Operation Commander’s plan, successfully blocking the enemy’s advances along Route 7A and the Muong Soui area, causing severe damage to the enemy’s main formation (23^rd GM) in the southern Plain of Jars, bringing the decisive engagement of the Operation to victory.

The success of the 1972 Plain of Jars - Xiangkhouang Defensive Operation marked the significant maturity of both our troops and Lao ones, in terms of both practical experience and theoretical understanding of defensive combat. The valuable lessons learned from the Operation, especially in the art of force utilisation and organisation should continue to be studied, applied, and developed creatively in our struggle for Fatherland protection.

Senior Colonel BUI THANH DAM, PhD

Infantry Officer College No.2

__________

1. The enemy had 76 infantry battalions, 3 artillery battalions, and 2 T-82 aircraft squadrons comprising 9 planes.

2. Enemy casualties: Nearly 60,000 enemy soldiers were put out of action, with heavy losses inflicted on three of Vang Pao’s mobile groups (21^st GM, 23^rd GM, 26^th GM), three Thai battalions, and five other mobile groups (15^th GM, 22^nd GM, 24^th GM, 30^th GM, 32^nd GM). Additionally, 38 enemy planes were shot down, and a large number of weapons were captured.

3. Our allied forces: 7 regular battalions, 1 tank company, 2 artillery companies, 2 anti-aircraft gun companies, 1 engineering company, and 4 local battalions.